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Nongovernmental organizations ("NGO"s)' should be given
opportunities to participate in the work of the World Trade
Organization ("WTO").2  Such opportunities need not be
unbounded; they can be structured carefully to maximize the
benefits of NGO participation and to minimize any ensuing
costs.' But it is important that the WTO abandon the insularity
and secrecy that characterized its predecessor, the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT").4 Eliminating the
most resilient and restrictive barriers to trade will require popular
approval. Thus, it is vital for the public to understand the aims
of the WTO and to develop trust in that organization.
The issue of public participation in the GATT did not
* Director, Global Environment & Trade Study (GETS), Yale University.
Support for this research was provided by The Pew Charitable Trusts and the
Ford Foundation.
' As used here, the term "NGO" includes all nongovernment organizations,
including business groups.
2 According to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, the General Council of the WTO "may make appropriate
arrangements for consultation and cooperation with non-governmental
organizations . . . ." GATT Secretariat, Final Act Embodying the Results of
the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, art. V(2), Apr. 15, 1994, reprinted
in 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1146 (1994) [hereinafter Final Act].
3 See JAMES CAMERON & Ross RAMSAY, PARTICIPATION BY NON-
GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION 29-
37 (Global Environment and Trade Study No. 1, 1995) (on file with author)
(recommending measures that should be introduced to enhance participation by
NGOs in the activities of the WTO).
4 For the most current version of the GATT Agreement, see GATT, TEXT
OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT (1986). For the original version of the GATT
Agreement, see The Protocol of Provisional Application of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, openedfor signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3,
55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
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originate in the "trade and environment" debate.5 In fact, a
primary U.S. objective in the Tokyo Round6 was "the adoption
of international fair labor standards and of public petition and
confrontation procedures in the GATT."7  That objective was
never achieved. Fifteen years later, when the issue of public
participation arose again, some environmental NGOs cleverly
borrowed the term "transparency," a word which at that time in
GATT circles referred to the trade laws and practices of each
country. The NGOs reasoned that if transparency was an
appropriate norm at the national level, it was also appropriate at
the international level.' In calling for more transparency, the
NGOs challenged the GATT to live up to its own principles by
increasing the flow of information to and from the public.'
These efforts towards transparency, initiated by NGOs,
stimulated governmental pressure within the GATT and resulted
in several advances toward openness. For instance, the GATT,
I For background on the "trade and environment" debate, and a specific
discussion of public participation in the GATT, see DANIEL C. ESTY,
GREENING THE GATT: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND THE FUTURE 211-15
(1994).
6 The "Tokyo Round" refers to the 7th round of multilateral trade
negotiations under the auspices of the GATT. Ninety-nine countries
participated in the Tokyo Round, which began in 1973 and ended in 1979. See
JOHN H. JACKSON & WILLIAM J. DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNA-
TIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 324-25 (2d ed. 1986). For a detailed discussion
on the results of the Tokyo Round, see GILBERT R. WINHAM, INTERNATION-
AL TRADE AND THE TOKYO ROUND NEGOTIATION (1986).
7 Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, S 121(a)(4), 88 Stat. 1986, 1986
(1974) (repealed 1988). The United States remains committed to openness in
trade policy actions under the GATT. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act,
19 U.S.C. S 3536 (1994) ("The Trade Representative shall seek the adoption...
of procedures that will ensure broader application of the principle of trans-
parency .... ").
8 See Patti A. Goldman, Resolving the Trade and Environment Debate: In
Search of a Neutral Forum and Neutral Principles, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1279, 1285-86, 1296-98 (1992) (discussing the secrecy surrounding the GATT
dispute settlement procedure and identifying the need for a neutral forum to
resolve trade disputes with participation by both government officials and
NGOs).
9 See TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT COMMITTEE, NATIONAL ADVISORY
COUNCIL FOR ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND TECHNOLOGY, THE GREENING
OF WORLD TRADE 18 (1993) (suggestin ways by which the U.S. Government
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and now the WTO, release Secretariat-drafted studies sooner;10
the Secretariat staff holds informal consultations with NGOs;"
the new WTO dispute settlement rules permit governments to
publicly disclose a statement of the positions it is taking in a
pending dispute;12 and the WTO recently joined the World Wide
Web.13
Yet in many other ways, the WTO remains as distant from
the public as the GATT was. Dispute settlement panels continue
to hold dosed sessions;14 the WTO will not release basic bio-
graphical information about panelists that would be useful in
assessing qualifications or potential conflicts of interest;1 5 panel
reports are not released to the public until after a report is
"0 See Trade and Environment: Group on Environmental Measures and
International Trade Progress report, Dec. 17, 1993, GATT BISD 40th Supp. 75,
98 (noting the Council's agreement that an accompanying list of documents be
derestricted).
" See Benedict Kingsbury, The Tuna-Dolphin Controversy, the World Trade
Organization, and the Liberal Project to Reconceptualize International Law, in 5
YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 1, 14 (1994) ("Very
recently the GATT/WTO system has gingerly begun consultations with
environmental groups . . ).
"2 See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement
of Disputes, Final Act, supra note 2, pt.2, Annex 2, art. 18(2), reprinted in 33
I.L.M. 1226, 1237(94 ("Nothing in this Understanding shall preclude a party
to a dispute frmds sn statements of its own positions to the public.")
[hereinafter Understanding].
13 Announcing that "the WTO must make itself well understood and truly
accessible," WTO Director-General Renato Ruggiero launched a WTO World
Wide Web information service on September 26, 1995. WTO Information
Service on the Internet, Focus: WTO NEWSLETTER, Aug.-Sept. 1995, at 12.
The WTO's World Wide Web server address is http: //www.unicc.org/wto
and internet enquiries can be sent to webmaster@wto.org. See id. The WTO
server "will be updated regularly and its information base progressively
expanded." Id.
14 See Understanding, supra note 12, art. 14, 33 I.L.M. at 1235. It is
interesting to note that in March 1993, the USTR - following a previous court
order - publicly released a copy of the legal brief it had submitted to the
Second GATT tuna-dolphin panel. The Netherlands, one of the co-plaintiffs
in that case, complained to the panel that the USTR action was a breach of
GATT rules. See Letter from J.F. Boddens Hosan , Ambassador of the
Kingdom of the Netherlands, to George Maciel, Chairman of the Panel on
United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (May 11, 1993) (on file with
author)
1" See Letter from Chloe Chapman, Information Division of the World
Trade Organization, to Steve Charnovitz (Jan. 30, 1996) (on file with author)
("Unfortunately, the biographies of trade dispute panelists ... are unavail-
able.").
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adopted; 6 NGOs may not observe regular meetings of the WTO
General Council and, indeed, minutes of these meetings remain
secret for two years;17 and finally all WTO committees, including
the Committee on Trade and Environment, convene in closed
sessions that NGO representatives may not attend.
The criticism of the GATT/WTO by NGOs is broad based.
Environmental NGOs have been at the forefront of the criticism,
but have been joined by NGOs from labor, development,
consumer, public interest, and farm groups. 8 Their arguments
can be capsulized by stating that the World Trade Organization
must look at the interests of the entire world. This globalized
perspective cannot be achieved effectively with input only from
those governmental trade officials who routinely attend WTO
meetings.
1 9
NGOs are on solid legal ground in seeking greater transparen-
16 See Lang Cites Corruption, Labor as Key Issues for First W'TO Ministerial,
INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Dec. 15, 1995, at 3 ("[A] number of WTO members again
blocked U.S. demands for the early release of dispute settlement panel reports
• .. decisions on the derestriction of documents and relations with NGOs
remained stalled"); see also Letter from the Information Office of the World
Trade Organization to Ms. Hari Osofsky (Feb. 2, 1996) (on file with author)
(stating that the new WTO panel report on U.S.-Venezuela-Brazil dispute is a
restricted document releasable to governments only); Letter from Tessa
Bridgman, World Trade Organization, to Steve Charnovitz (Feb. 2, 1996) (on
file with author) (stating that no public information will be available on the
Gasoline case until after the panel report is adopted). The January 29, 1996
WTO panel ruling on the "United States - Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline" case can be found at http://www.gets.org/gets.
17 Interview with William Davey, Director of the WTO Legal Affairs
Division, (Nov. 3, 1995).
" U.S. NGOs joining the criticism of the WTO system include: the
Animal Welfare Institute, the Center for Science in the Public Interest, Citizen
Action, National Consumers League, the AFL-CIO, Public Citizen, Institute
for Agriculture and Trade Policy, Government Accountability Project,
Consumer Federation of America, and Development Gap. See Charles E.
Hayes, Asia-Europe Summit Draws NGOs, EARTH TIMES, Mar. 15, 1996, at 5
(stating that Asian and European NGOs "called for a rejection of the World
Trade Organization paradigm of development").
19 Meetings of the WTO Trade and Environment Committee have included
environmental officials from a handful of countries, not just trade officials. See
David Runnalls, Let's Have More Transparency at WTO, EARTH TIMES, Mar. 15,
1996, at 21 ("Even the meetings of the Committee on Trade and Environment
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cy and participation in the WTO.20 Drawing on the expertise of
NGOs is a hallmark of other intergovernmental organizations and
institutions. For example, Agenda 21, a program of action
implemented by the United Nations Conference on Environment
and Development ("UNCED"), states that:
all intergovernmental organizations and forums should, in
consultation with non-governmental organizations, take
measures to: ... enhance existing or, where they do not
exist, establish, mechanisms and procedures within each
agency to draw on the expertise and views of non-govern-
mental organizations in policy and programme design,
implementation and evaluation; [and]... [p]rovide access
for non-governmental organizations to accurate and timely
data and information to promote the effectiveness of their
programmes and activities ....
In fact, most other international organizations have done far more
than the WTO to involve NGOs in their work.' For example,
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
("OECD") has active advisory groups drawn from business and
trade unionsY The International Labour Organization ("ILO")
20 See Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Precaution, Participation, and the aGreening of
International Trade Law, 7 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 57, 93 (1992) (describing
many global environmental laws, such as the Bergen Declaration and the
Bangkok Declaration, which speak of the importance of public participation of
NGOs relating to the environment).
" Agenda 21, art. 27(9), U.N. DOG. A/CONF.151/26 (1993).
' See General Review of Current Arrangements for Consultations with Non-
Governmental Organizations: Report of the Secretary General, U.N. ESCOR, 1st
Sess., Agenda Item 3, at 2, U.N. DOC. E/AC.70/1994 (1994) (noting how
international organizations involve NGOs in their work); PREPARATORY
COMMITTEE FOR THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, SUB-COMMITTEE ON
TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT, Arrangements for Relations with Non-Governmen-
tal Organizations in the United Nations, Its Related Bodies and Selected Other
Inter-Governmental Organizations (1994). Note that this WTO document from
the preparatory committee was classified as restricted, unlike the UN document
from which it was drawn.
" The OECD's foundational document provides the authority for these
active advisory groups. See Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development, Dec. 14, 1960, art. 12, T.I.A.S. No. 4891, 888
U.N.T.S. 179, 187 [hereinafter OECD Convention]. A new NGO advisory
committee to the OECD is being created for the environment. See Barbara
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includes workers and employers as delegates to that organiza-
tion. 4 Especially in recent years, NGOs have become important
players in many international conferences and organizations.'
Casassus, OECD Environment Ministers Fail To Reach Accord On Lead,
Chemical Data, Daily Rep. Executives (BNA) No. 34, at A-24, A-25 (Feb. 21,
1996).
24 See Instrument for the Amendment of the Constitution of the
International Labour Organisation, Oct. 9, 1946, art. 3, T.I.A.S. No. 1868, 15
U.N.T.S. 35, 38 [hereinafter ILO Constitution].
" See, e.g., ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW
SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREE-
MENTS 250, 251 (1995) ("Nongovernmental organizations perform parallel and
supplementary functions at almost every step of the strategy for regime
management we have begun to identify."); HARLAN CLEVELAND, BIRTH OF A
NEW WORLD: AN OPEN MOMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL LEADERSHIP 74
(1993) (stating that the history of the United Nations is "replete with evidence
that nongovernments have often taken the lead in making and carrying out
international policies"); COMMISSION ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, OUR
GLOBAL NEIGHBORHOOD 32-35 (1995) (stating that the UN Conference on
Environment and Development accredited more than 1400 NGOs in 1992 for
the Rio conference on human rights); YOLANDA KAKABADSE N. & SARAH
BURNS, MOVERS AND SHAPERS: NGOS IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS I (World
Resources Institute ed., 1994) (stating that UNCED "legitimized NGOs as a
vital players in the environmental and development dialogue"); MARINE
MAMMAL COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 1995 107 (1996)
(discussing a recent episode where five environmental groups negotiated directly
with the government of Mexico toward the development of a new regional
intergovernmental agreement on dolphin protection) [hereinafter MARINE
MAMMAL COMMISSION]; Barbara J. Bramble & Gareth Porter, Non-Governmen-
tal Organizations and the Making of US International Environmental Policy, in
THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT 311-13 (Andrew
Hurrel & Benedict Kingsbury eds., 1992) (exploring the contribution of NGOs
to the formulation of international environmental policy); Betty Ferber et al.,
Building an Environmental Protection Framework oar North America: The Role
of the Non-Governmental Community, in GREEN GLOBE YEARBOOK 1995 83-
92 (1995) (discussing the role of NGOs in protecting the environment); Hilary
F. French, Forging a New Global Partnership, in STATE OF THE WORLD 1995
185-88 (Linda Starke ed., 1995) (discussing NGO participation in the Rio
conference on human rights); Benedict Kingsbury, Whose International Law?
Sovereignty and Non-State Groups, 68 AM. L. SOc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 1 (1994)
(discussing the relationship between NGOs and indigenous peoples); Thomas
Princen et al., Nongovernmental Organizations in World Environmental Politics,
7 INT'L ENvTL. AFF. 42 (1995) (discussing NGO participation in the African
Elephant case and the Great Lakes basinwide pollution problem); David Reed,
The Global Environment Facility and Non-Governmental Organizations, 9 AM.
U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 191 (1993) (explaining NGO involvement in the
establishment of environmental standards); Peter J. Spiro, New Global
Communities: Nongovernmental Organizations in International Decision-Making
Institutions, 18 WASH. Q., Winter 1995, at 45 (indicating that "NGO's have
emerged as prime movers on a broad range of global issues); Patricia Waak,
[17:1
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Indeed, the World Bank is searching for a new kind of employee
it calls an "NGO Specialist."26 Of course it should be noted that
NGOs remain largely shut out of the International Monetary
Fund, as well as international military, nuclear, and law enforce-
ment organizations.
NGOs are playing increasingly important roles in direct
negotiations with governments. For example, in September 1995,
several environmental groups undertook discussions with the
Government of Mexico to explore the possibility of a new
convention to protect dolphins during tuna fishing." This
compromise led to a declaration by twelve nations, including the
United States, calling for a binding international agreement to be
signed by 1996.28 In January 1996, the Worldwide Fund for
Nature reached an agreement with the Government of Finland
and a major forestry company in Finland to permit a recom-
mencement of logging operations in Russia's Karelian forest.29
It is sometimes suggested that NGO involvement in the
GATT/WTO would contradict the principles upon which the
global organization was established. This argument, however,
ignores the early attempts by the postwar multilateral trading
Shaping a Sustainable Planet. The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations, 6
COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 345, 361 (1995) (stating that the "leadership
and relative success of the NGOs in Cairo is a foundation that must be built
upon to further strengthen the voice of the global citizen"); David A. Wirth,
Public Participation in International Processes: Environmental Case Studies at the
National and International Levels, 7 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1, 4
(1996) (discussing whether the disparity in nonstate participation at the national
and internation policymakin levels is warranted in the areas of public health
and the environment); Daniel J Shepard, Nongovernmental Organizations Move
From Grassroots to Corridors of Diplomacy, EARTH TIMES, Mar. 15-31, at 16
(stating that "NGOs have seen their role at international conferences
transformed from mere observer status at best to the point where they are now
inextricably intertwined in the process of setting global policy"); Policy Notes:
World Bankand NGOs, EARTH TIMES, Mar. 15, 1996, at 4 (announcing that the
World Bank will allow various sectors of civil society, including NGOs, to
participate in the Bank's decisionmaking processes).
2 See Appointments, EcONOMIST, Jan. 6, 1996, at 85 (advertising for "NGO
Specialists," positions that "involve developing and managing training programs,
organizing workshops for resident missions in developing countries, and
developing the series of studies on State-NGOs relations").
27 See MARINE MAMMAL COMMISSION, supra note 25, at 107.
28 See id.
29 See Logging Resumes in Karelian Under Pact Between WWF, Finland,
Finnish Forestry Firm, Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA), at 180 (Mar. 6, 1996).
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system to involve NGOs.0 The original plan of the Bretton
Woods system provided for an International Trade Organization
("ITO") to be flanked by the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund.3 The United Nations initiated negotiations for
the ITO in 1946 and concluded in 1948 with the Charter for the
International Trade Organization.32 Article 87(2) of the ITO
Charter provided that "[t]he Organization may make suitable
arrangements for consultation and co-operation with nongovern-
mental organizations concerned with matters within the scope of
this Charter."
33
For various political reasons, the ITO never came into exis-
tence.34 Instead, the GATT - which was originally intended to
be superseded by the ITO - replaced the ITO as a defacto treaty
and organization. It is instructive, however, to look at how the
Interim Commission for the ITO intended to implement ITO
Article 87(2). In May 1949, the Interim Commission Secretariat
- which later became the GATT Secretariat - prepared a report
for the first ITO Conference which, among other topics, proposed
30 For further discussion of NGO involvement in the post-war multilateral
trading system, see Steve Charnovitz & John Wickham, Non-Governmental
Organizations and the Original International Trade Regime, 29 J. WORLD
TRADE 111, 113 (1995) (discussing efforts by the United Nation Conference on
Trade and Employment and the Interim Commission for the ITO to involve
NGOs).
3" See Frederick M. Abbott, Trade and Democratic Values, 1 MINN. J.
GLOBAL TRADE 9, 14 (1992) ("The International Monetary Fund and
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development were established to
p rovide stability and liquidity in world financial markets as well as to providefnds for development. The third in the triumvirate of international
institutions planned for the post-war era was to be the International Trade
Organization."). See also THE ~BRETTON WOODS-GATT SYSTEM: RETROSPECT
AND PROSPECT AFTER FIFTY YEARS (Orin Kirshner ed., 1996) (detailing the
history and adaptations of the Bretton Woods economic system).
32 The same conference also wrote the GATT agreement. See KENNETH
DAM, THE GATT 10-11 (1970); ALSO PRESENT AT THE CREATION: DANA
WILGRESS AND THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND
EMPLOYMENT AT HAVANA (Michael Hart ed., 1995) (discussing the origin of
the ITO and providing full text of the Charter).
33 I.T.O. CHARTER, art. 87(2), rqrinted in U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
HAVANA CHARTER FOR AN INTERNATIONAL TRADE ORGANIZATION 110
(1948).
34 See William Diebold, Reflections on the International Trade Organization,
14 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 335 (1994) (citing lack of business and government
support as well as uncertainty about the potential effectiveness of certain
provisions as primary reasons why the ITO failed).
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procedures for NGO involvement in the ITO.3" This proposal
suggested that: (1) appropriate NGOs be listed as consultative
organizations; 6 (2) these listed organizations be invited to ITO
Conference sessions;37 (3) NGO representatives be able to make
statements on items on which they had submitted reports, and on
other items at the discretion of the chairperson; 8 and (4) these
organizations receive ITO documents as necessary for effective
consultation.39 Member governments extensively discussed these
procedures and would have likely adopted them if the ITO came
into existence.'
The fact that the negotiators of the ITO treaty provided for
NGO participation, combined with evidence that the Interim ITO
was prepared to implement this provision, together demonstrate
that NGO participation is consistent with the design and
aspirations of the multilateral trading system. That the GATT
behaved in a more introverted way does not detract from the
intention of the founders of the trading system.
41
The WTO Agreement provides that "[t]he General Council
may make appropriate arrangements for consultation and
cooperation with non-governmental organizations concerned with
matters related to those of the WTO."42 So far, the WTO
" For the text of this ITO proposal, see Charnovitz & Wickham, supra
note 30, at 120-21.
36 See Proposed Report of the Interim Commission to the First Conference of
the International Trade Organization 59 (1949) (on file at the U.S. National
Archives, Box 153, Lot File 57D-284).
37 See id.
38 See id.
39 See id. at 60.
" See Charnovitz & Wickham, supra note 30, at 121 ("Had opposition to
the ITO not developed, there is every indication that the recommendations...
concerning NGOs would have been approved by the First Conference of the
ITO.-).
" See Philip M. Nichols, Extension of Standing in World Trade Organization
Disputes to Nongovernmental Parties, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 295, 307 n.57
(1996) (noting articipation by International Chamber of Commerce in the
early years of the GATT).
2 Final Act, supra note 2, art. V(2), 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1146. The WTO
Agreement on the Rules of Origin provides that the chairman of the Technical
Committee may invite representatives of "international governmental and trade
organizations" to attend meetings as observers. GATT SECRETARIAT, TE
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIA-
TIONS, THE LEGAL TEXTS Annex 1A (1994) [hereinafter LEGAL TEXTS].
1996]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
General Council has not begun to implement this provision.
There is a wide range of opinion on what is "appropriate" for
NGOs to see, hear, and do. Nevertheless, the straightforward
nature of this provision, and its similarity to the original provi-
sion in the ITO, make it difficult for WTO members to argue
convincingly that the WTO is different from other international
organizations in its ability to institutionalize NGO participation.
In his thoughtful contribution to this symposium, Professor
Philip Nichols raises a number of important concerns about
granting standing to NGOs in the WTO dispute resolution
mechanism. 43 He responds to a notable article by Professor G.
Richard Shell which proposes a new model for trade governance
called the "Trade Stakeholders Model."' This essay comments
on some points raised by Nichols.
There are two major issues relating to NGO participation in
the WTO. The first is NGO participation in the policy work of
the WTO as carried out in various committees, such as the
Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade. The second is NGO
participation in the WTO dispute resolution process as plaintiffs,
amici curiae, witnesses, or observers. These general issues are
separable. The WTO could involve NGOs in the policy commit-
tees but not in dispute resolution on the grounds that public
disclosure would harden positions, chill negotiations, and hinder
settlements. Likewise, the WTO could open up dispute resolution
but not the policy committees on the grounds that fact collection
and adjudication should be insulated from interest group pressure.
These two major issues regarding NGO participation in the
WTO, followed by some conclusions, are discussed in turn.
2. PARTICIPATION IN WTO POLICYMAKING
Nichols hypothesizes that "[i]t is unlikely that member
countries would be willing to entrust negotiations involving
sovereignty to any entity other than themselves." 4 Assuming
that Nichols' statement is true, there remain a number of useful
NGO activities which fall short of signing - or signing off on -
43 See Nichols, supra note 41, at 315-21.
4 See G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory:
An Analysis of the World Trade Organization, 44 DUKE LJ. 829 (1995).
4' Nichols, supra note 41, at 308-09.
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46treaties. For example, NGOs can facilitate negotiations in
several ways by providing expert information, serving as a
sounding board for possible compromises, injecting new ideas into
a substantive debate, securing public support necessary for
parliamentary approval, and serving as monitors to enforce
governmental commitments. 4'
One concern about NGO involvement is that it would slow
down WTO policymaking which would be an undesirable effect.
On the other hand, NGO participation in the GATT Uruguay
Round, which took over seven years to negotiate, might have
expedited the negotiating process.4" The NGOs might have
catalyzed trade negotiators and encouraged them to look beyond
mercantilist interests. Certainly, the involvement of NGOs in the
environment regime has not caused undue delay in negotiating
environmental agreements. In fact, during the seven years of
Uruguay Round negotiations, no less than seven global environ-
mental agreements were reached.49
One reason why the Uruguay Round took so long to
complete was because little occurred during extended periods of
time as governments either stewed at each other or awaited
national elections in individual countries.50 With NGOs at the
table, the governments might have been prodded toward more
diligent negotiations. NGO involvement also might have
stimulated the trade negotiators to obtain more significant results
than those that were achieved.51
46 SeeLAWRENCEE. SUSSKIND, ENVIRONMENTALDIPLOMACY: NEGOTIAT-
ING MORE EFFECTIVE GLOBAL AGREEMENTS 130-31 (1994). Susskind prefers
the terminology of nongovernmental interests ("NGI"s) as opposed to NGOs.
See id.
47 See id.
48 See generally THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING
HISTORY 1-6 (Terence P. Stewart ed., 1993) (discussing the laborious years of
negotiating the Uruguay Round Agreement) [hereinafter A NEGOTIATING
HISTORY].
'9 See Jessica Mathews, The Great Greenless GA 77, WASH. POST, Apr. 11,
1994, at A19.
10 One issue that delayed the Uruguay Round negotiations was the U.S.-
E.U. dispute over agriculture. See A NEGOTIATING HISTORY, supra note 48,
at 217 ("The EC-U.S. agriculture dispute took center-stage leaving most of the
other 106 participants out of subsequent talks.").
51 For a detailed examination of the strengths and weaknesses of the
Uruguay Round results, see JEFFREY J. SCHOTT & JOHANNA W. BUURMAN,
THE URUGUAY ROUND: AN ASSESSMENT 8 (1994) (giving the Uruguay Round
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Nichols worries that the presence of NGOs would undermine
"the apparent authority" of governments, and thus their ability to
negotiate trade policies.5 2 While it is true that NGOs could have
that effect, NGOs also could stimulate the opposite reaction. A
government backed by NGOs might actually find its credibility
strengthened in negotiations as other countries perceive an
enhanced ability to follow through on its commitments.
Nichols argues that involving NGOs implies that "national
governments do not adequately represent the interests of all of
their constituencies." 3 That proposition is surely true. Indeed,
many national governments fail to represent the interests of even
a majority of their constituencies as periodically reflected by low
approval ratings. Yet, one need not posit a failure in democracy
to support greater NGO participation in international organiza-
tions. To the contrary, NGO participation should be viewed as
an exemplification of the democratic vision.
The case for policymaking participation of national NGOs in
international organizations is not premised on the incompetence
of national governments to balance domestic interests. It may be
that governments do the best possible job of balancing conflicting
interests. Instead, the contention is that international organiza-
tions will perform more effectively if they have the input of
interest groups. The exact same argument justifies NGO involve-
ment in domestic rulemaking54 Why should NGOs be involved
in the creation of national law, but not international law?55
The case for the policymaking involvement of international
NGOs in international organizations is a different matter. While
a B+ grade overall).
52 Nichols, supra note 41, at 316.
53 Id. at 310-311.
54 See KoNRAD VON MoLTKE, INTERNATIONAL ENvIRONMENTAL
MANAGEMENT, TRADE -. EGIMES AND SUSTAINABILITY 28 (International
Institute for Sustainable Development ed., 1996) ("[T~he provision of
information and public participation are designed to help make public policy
choices which are firmly grounded in the articulated needs of citizens. The
logic of public participation in environmental policy does not end at national
frontiers.").
See generally Marek St. Korowicz, The Problem of the International
Personality of Individuals, 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 533, 561 (1956) (stating that
because "the right of individuals to proceed before international bodies is
almost non-existent today in international law practice, does not exclude the
creation of this right at any moment by agreement of states").
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one can argue that the views of national NGOs are represented by
national governments, the same argument cannot be made for
international NGOs, such as the WWF International, the Interna-
tional Confederation of Free Trade Unions, or the International
Chamber of Commerce. International NGOs have no national
government to represent them; they only have international
organizations.
Nichols opines that "it is difficult to envisage a scheme that
could equitably allow for direct participation by all of the citizens
of the world."56  This view is correct. Nobody, however, calls
for such direct participation, but rather NGOs advocate an
organized process of NGO involvement. Borrowing from the
procedures of the United Nations Economic and Social Coun-
cil,57 the OECD,58 the ILO,59 and the 1949 ITO Secretariat
proposals,6" the WTO General Council could easily formulate a
workable set of arrangements for NGO participation.
Nichols also worries that NGO participation would be
problematic because some groups would have greater resources for
participation than others.61 The issue of disparate resources is a
pervasive problem in any organization. In fact, disparate resource
allocation is currently a problem for governmental representation
at the WTO. After all, the U.S. Trade Representative has more
staff in the WTO headquarters city of Geneva than does the
Geneva delegation of trade ministry of The Congo.
The most serious concern raised by Nichols is that NGO
participation "might cause the World Trade Organization to move
away from or be unable to pursue the goal of free trade."
6 2
According to Nichols, trade scholars believe that the GATT's
"low public profile" was "one of the largest contributors to trade
56 Nichols, supra note 41, at 313.
17 UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, RULES OF
PROCEDURE OF THE ECOSOC, U.N. Doc. E/5715/Rev.1 (1983); see UNITED
NATIONS CHARTER art. 71.
ss See OECD Convention, supra note 23.
19 See ILO Constitution, supra note 24, art. 3, T.I.A.S. No. 1868, 15
U.N.T.S. at 38.
60 See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
61 See Nichols, supra note 41, at 318-19. Nichols makes this point with
particular reference to dispute panels. See id.
62 See Nichols, supra note 41, at 319.
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liberalization over the past fifty years." 63 Even if GATT's low
public profile largely contributed to trade liberalization in the past
- and it is possible that GATT's low public profile was the main
reason why trade liberalization proceeded so slowly over the past
50 years - it seems unlikely to remain so in the future as trade
assumes a larger role in U.S. political discourse.
A recent U.S. public opinion poll found strong support
among U.S. citizens for protectionism. Over 68% of the U.S.
public would support the imposition of "tariffs on products from
countries that have a trade imbalance with the United States.""
In recent years, there has been a resurgence in protectionist
literature65 and in 1995, with the advent of a Republican-con-
trolled Congress, trade liberalization proposals stalled.66  By
winter 1996, trade became a key issue in the Republican Presiden-
tial campaign. 67
Given the heightened public attention to trade, it is unlikely
that the WTO will be able to maintain the anonymity of the
GATT.68 Nor should it.69 The WTO should actively engage in
63 Id.
6 John Maggs, Poll Shows Opposition to Clinton's Trade Policy, J. COM.,
Nov. 14, 1995, at 1A. It is unclear whether respondents were told that almost
all countries do have an imbalance with the United States.
61 See, e.g., SIR JAMES GOLDSMITH, THE RESPONSE: GATT AND GLOBAL
FREE TRADE (1995) (arguing against the policies of GATT); RAVI BATRA, THE
MYTH OF FREE TRADE: A PLAN FOR AMERICA'S ECONOMIC REVIVAL (1993)
(arguing that free trade will not promote economic revival); SIR JAMES
GOLDSMITH, THE TRAP 23-52 (1993) (concluding that GATT and the WTO
hand U.S. autonomy over to international bureaucrats); TIM LANG & COLIN
HINES, THE NEW PROTECTIONISM: PROTECTING THE FUTURE AGAINST FREE
TRADE (1993) (arguing for a "new protectionism"); RALPH NADER ET AL., THE
CASE AGAINST FREE TRADE: GATT, NAFTA, AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF
CORPORATE POWER (1993) (highlighting various arguments against free trade);
ROSS PEROT, SAVE YOUR JOB, SAVE OUR COUNTRY: WHY NAFTA MUST
BE STOPPED - Now! (1993) (arguing that NAFTA gives Mexico distinct
competitive advantages over the United States).
66 See Steve Charnovitz, The Trade-Blind Congress of '95, J. COM., Dec. 29,
1995, at 6A. See also William L. Roberts, Buchanan Wins Support By Knocking
Free Trade, J. COM., Jan. 16, 1996, at 1A (reporting that some of Patrick
Buchanan's political support stems from his opposition to NAFTA and the
WTO).
67 See Richard L. Berke, Candidates Clash Over Trade Issues Heading Into
Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1996, at Al, A14; David E. Sanger, A Flare-Up of
Passions Over Global Trade, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1996, at Al, A14.
6 For example, the recent WTO panel decision declaring that a key section
of the Clean Air Act violated international trade rules generated much
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educating the public about the dangers of protectionist trade
policies, just as the World Health Organization educates the
public about communicable disease.
The notion that the international trade regime should be a
buffer between the makers of trade policy and the public is an
elitist view that should not find refuge in liberal governance. The
founders of the international trade regime were well aware of the
need to obtain popular support in removing domestic trade
barriers. 70 Indeed, the U.S. reciprocal trade agreements program,
begun in 1934, contains institutional procedures for broad public
participation.71 As Francis B. Sayre, an architect of the U.S.
reciprocal trade agreements program, explained in 1938:
Never before has consideration of tariff matters been so
free from logrolling, politics, and narrow sectional influ-
ences. Formerly, professional lobbyists frequently crowd-
ed others off the stage. Now there exists an effective
means, available to all without cost, whereby everyone is
assured of a careful and impartial hearing by trained
officials who have no party interest to serve ... It is a
process which is thoroughly democratic and thoroughly
publicity. See David E. Sanger, Trade Group Orders U.S. To Alter Law For First
Time, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1996 at 1. For a critique of this report, see Steve
Charnovitz, The WTO Panel Decision on U.S. Clean Air Act Regulations, Int'l
Envtl. Rep. (BNA), at 191-96 (Mar. 6, 1996).
69 See John H. Jackson, World Trade Rules and Environmental Policies:
Congruence or Coniict?, 49 WASH & LEE L. REv. 1227, 1255 (1992) ("For
purposes of gaining a broader constituency among the various policy interested
communities in the world, gaining the trust of those constituencies, enhancing
public understanding, as well as avoiding the 'charade' of ineffective attempts
to maintain secrecy, the GATT could go much further in providing
'transparency' of its processes.").
'7 See Steve Charnovitz, No Time for NEPA: Trade Areements on a Fast
Track, 3 MINN. J. OF GLOBAL TRADE 195, 215-16 (1994) (discussing the public
participation in the making of trade policy under President Franklin
Roosevelt's Administration).
71 See Tariff Act Amendments of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-316, § 4, 48 Stat.
943, 945 (stating that "any interested person may have an opportunity to
present his views to the President, or to such agency as the President may
designate, under such rules and regulations as the President may prescribe");
Exec. Order No. 6,750 (1934).
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American in the best sense of that word."2
Although Nichols seems to support freer trade, one of his
statements about the GATT/WTO regime is truly inconsistent
with such beliefs. Nichols states: "Having sorted out trade policy
issues at the national level, bureaucrats are free to cooperate with
other governments to maximize national and global welfare
without the intrusion of special interests."73 If Nichols means
that governmental trade officials reliably favor trade liberalization
policies, he is not correctly describing the 47 years of GATT trade
governance. International trade remains saddled with tariffs,
quotas, and nontariff restrictions. Indeed, by one estimate, only
seven percent of world production crossing national borders is
subject to the trade liberalization rules of the GATT.74 Further-
more, trade officials have frequently sought to maximize national
welfare instead of global welfare, sometimes leading policymakers
to pursue protectionist policies that advance neither goal.7
Although Nichols focuses on the implications of Shell's "Trade
Stakeholders Model" for WTO dispute settlement, Shell actually
makes a broader point about the need for NGOs in all WTO
decisionmaking. 76 Shell explains that "ultimately, individuals and
NGOs will need to become more deeply involved in the legisla-
tive process by which the world trade community creates rules
72 FRANCIS B. SAYRE, How TRADE AGREEMENTS ARE MADE 16 (U.S.
State Dep't Commercial Policy Series No. 47, 1938). For a revisionist perspec-
tive, see ALFRED E. ECKES, JR., OPENING AMERICA'S MARKET: U.S. FOREIGN
TRADE POLICY SINCE 1776 143 (1995) (explaining that in place of the "rela-
tively transparent and accountable process" pursued when Congress wrote tariff
legislation, Cordell Hull delegated-tariff making authority to a small group of
middle-level officials who were not subject to Congressional confirmation).
3 Nichols, supra note 41, at 320.
74 See THE UN AND THE BRETTON WOODS INSTITUTIONS: NEW CHAL-
LENGES FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 5 (Mahbub ul Haq et al. eds.,
1995).
75 See JAGDISH BHAGwATI, PROTECTIONISM 43-59 (1989) (discussing the
growth of nontariff barriers); JAMES BOvARD, THE FAIR TRADE FRAUD 321
1!991) (stating that "politicians and bureaucrats [are] constantly changing the
defimtion of fairness to justify new trade barriers"); GARY C. HUFBAUER &
KIMBERLY A. ELLIOTT, MEASURING THE COSTS OF PROTECTION IN THE
UNITED STATES (1994); DOUGLAS IRWIN, MANAGED TRADE: THE CASE
AGAINST IMPORT TARGETS (1994); ANNE 0. KRUEGER, AMERICAN TRADE
POLICY: A TRAGEDY IN THE MAKING (1995).
76 See Shell, supra note 44, at 910, 913-15, 922-24.
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and standards - not just the adjudicative process by which these
rules are applied."' Furthermore, Shell believes that the trading
regime must be more inclusive in order to integrate both trade
and nontrade values.78 Nichols, equally sensitive to the problem
of clashing values, takes a different approach than Shell's model
and proposes that "laws that primarily reflect important underly-
ing societal values and only incidentally impede trade should not
be subjected to scrutiny by the [WTO]." 9 While Shell would
broaden participation in WTO review, Nichols would exempt
certain laws from that review.
If the WTO is going to expand its work into new areas such
as investment, competition policy, environment, labor standards,
and corrupt practices,"0 it will need a broader base of participa-
tion than just national trade ministers. However, even if the
WTO were to focus only upon narrow issues of trade liberaliza-
tion, the case for Shell's Trade Stakeholders Model would still be
strong - primarily because eradicating protectionism is an
enormous task which requires the full involvement of all
stakeholders.81 As the "GATT Wisemen" advised a decade ago:
An essential first step in developing support for better
trade policies is public awareness. We recommend that, in
each country, governments make a conscious and continu-
ing effort to expand public knowledge of the costs and
hazards of protectionism, the benefits of open trading
policies, and the functioning of the multilateral trading
system. Channels for such an effort could include universi-
ties and schools, strengthened national consumer groups,
and advisory groups made up of influential and active
representatives of the main stakeholders in international
77 Id. at 922.
78 See id.
7 Nichols, supra note 41, at 297; see also Philip M. Nichols, Trade Without
Values, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 658, 709 (1996).
" For a discussion of some areas of future WTO involvement, see Renato
Ruggiero, The Global Challenge: Opportunities and Choices in the Multilateral
Trading System (WTO Press Release, Oct. 16, 1995) (on file with author).
" For a discussion of "anti-protection" interest groups, see I.M. DESTLER
& JOHN S. ODELL, ANTI-PROTECTION: CHANGING FORCES IN UNITED
STATES TRADE POLITICS 30-59 (1987).
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trade - business, finance, labour and consumers.12
3. PARTICIPATION IN WTO DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Although Nichols comments on "standing" of NGOs to
participate in the WTO dispute resolution process, this issue is far
removed from the contemporary political debate. For better or
worse, no government or major NGO argues that NGOs ought
to have "standing" as a plaintiff to invoke WTO dispute resolu-
tion. Instead, the contemporary debate addresses whether an
NGO ought to be able to submit an amicus brief or testify before
a dispute panel in a public hearing.3 NGOs also seek access to
government briefs.84 At this point, NGOs are not pursuing the
right to make oral arguments before a panel, nor the right to
cross-examine the plaintiff or defendant governments.
If history is a guide, whether NGOs should have standing as
WTO plaintiffs is an interesting legal question that surely will
arise in the next century and has been resolved in other contexts.
For example, as delegates to the ILO, employer and worker
NGOs do have standing to lodge complaints about a government's
conformity with its responsibilities under a ratified ILO conven-
tion.8" Furthermore, environmental NGOs have standing in
U.S. courts to challenge federal actions as "interested" humans, but
82 GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, TRADE POLICIES FOR
A BETTER FUTURE: PROPOSALS FOR ACTION 36-37 (1985) (emphasis added).
83 See Robert F. Housman, Democratizing International Trade Decision-
making, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 699, 744-46 (1994) (offering proposals for the
democratization of trade disputes); Benedict Kingsbury, Environment and Trade:
The GA TT/WTO Regime in the International Legal System, in ENViRONMENTAL
REGULATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 225 (A.E. Boyle ed., 1994) ("There
is NGO pressure to hold panel hearings in public and to make state submis-
sions and panel reports public at an early stage.").
84 The new WTO Agreement provides that a government which is a party
to a dispute must, at the request of a member government, provide a non-
confidential summary of the information contained in its submissions to the
panel. See Trade Policy Review Mechanism, in LEGAL TEXTS, supra note 42,
at Annex 3, para. 3.
85 See INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, CONSTITUTION OF THE
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION AND STANDING ORDERS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONFERENCE, arts. 24-25. NGOs may also submit
information to the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association.
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not generally as representatives of nature.86 In the European
Union, individuals who are challenging laws in national courts
may seek to refer the case to the European Court of Justice under
Article 177 for a determination as to whether a national law is
violative of provisions of the Treaty of Rome ensuring the free
flow of goods.87 The North American Free Trade Agreement
("NAFTA") contains a provision giving a private investor the
right to invoke arbitration when it believes that a NAFTA
member government has violated NAFTA's rules on invest-
ment.8 This provision was invoked for the first time in March
1996 by a Mexican drug company who complained about
Canadian regulations of generic drugs.89
One certainly can imagine a system whereby NGOs or
individuals would be able to invoke the WTO dispute process. 90
For example, the European Union has entered into an agreement
with several developing countries to limit imports of bananas.91
A consumer group in Europe should be able to file a complaint
that this Agreement violates GATT Article XI, which requires the
86 See Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?Revisited How Far
Will Law and Morals Reach? A Pluralist Perspective, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 1-29
(1985) (discussing natural objects' lack of standing in court); CHRISTOPHER D.
STONE, THE GNAT IS OLDER THAN MAN: GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT AND
HUMAN AGENDA 54, 85-88 (1993) (promoting a "guardianship system" in
which cases could effectively be brought on behalf of nature itself). For a
recent case where NGOs were given standing before the U.S. Court of Interna-
tional Trade, see Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher, Nos. 94-06-00321, 95-208,
1995 WL 782856 (Ct. Int'l Trade Dec. 29, 1995).
87 See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25,
1957, art. 177, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 76-77, amended by Treaty of European Union
and Final Act, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 OJ. C191/1 [hereinafter EU Treaty]. For a
comprehensive discussion of the ECJ's ability to hear cases directly affected by
the Treaty of Rome, see Ann-Marie Burley & Walter Mattli, Europe Before the
Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration, 47 INT'L ORG. 41, 42 (1993);
Shell, supra note 44, at 919; GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 180-92 (1993).
88 See North American Free Trade Agreement Between the Government
of the United States of American, the Government of Canada and the Govern-
ment of the Mexican States, Dec. 17, 1992, art. 1116, 32 I.L.M. 605, 642-43
(1993).
89 See Aviva Freudmann, Mexican Firm Sues Canada In First Use Of Nafta
Rule, J. COM., Mar. 18, 1996, at 3A.
90 See Shell, supra note 44, at 902.
91 See Costa Rica-Colombia-Dominican Republic-European Community-
Nicaragua-Venezuala: Framework Agreement on Banana Imports, Mar. 29,
1994, 34 I.L.M. 1 (1995).
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general elimination of quantitative restrictions,92 especially if no
government is willing to do so. 3
For the foreseeable future, however, the WTO seems unlikely
to grant that sort of standing. A logical interim step would be to
give the WTO Secretariat the right to lodge complaints, in the
same way that the European Commission has the right to bring
a matter before the European Court of Justice.94 In one area, the
WTO does require standing for private parties in national
tribunals. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectu-
al Property Rights provides that:
Members shall ... adopt procedures to enable a right
holder, who has valid grounds for suspecting that the
importation of counterfeit trademark or pirated copyright
goods may take place, to lodge an application in writing
with competent authorities, administrative or judicial, for
the suspension by the customs authorities of the release
into free circulation of such goods.9"
Environmental and public interest NGOs are seeking an
opportunity to participate in WTO dispute resolution because the
WTO has become an important forum for international environ-
92 Article XI(1) of the GATT Agreement states:
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other
charges, whether made effective through quotas, import or export
licences or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any
contracting party on the importation of any product of the territory
of any other contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export
of any product destinedfor the territory of any other contracting
party.
GATT, supra note 4, art. XI(1), 61 Stat. at A32-33, 55 U.N.T.S. at 224, 226.
" The U.S. government is preparing a WTO challenge to the agreement
on bananas between the EU, Costa Rica, Colombia, Dominican Republic,
Nicaragua, and Venezuela. See Frances Williams, US Steps Up Banana Fight,
FIN. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1996, at 5.
9' See EU Treaty, supra note 87, art. 169, 298 U.N.T.S. at 75. For the most
recent version of article 169, see TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNTmES (abridged ed., 1987).
91 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
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mental adjudication. 6  As Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann recently
pointed out, "[t]he GATT dispute settlement system has been used
more frequently for the settlement of 'environmental disputes'
between states than any other international dispute settlement
mechanism."' 7
There are two main justifications for NGO participation in
dispute resolution. First, NGO participation will increase the
information available to the panel, thereby leading to better
informed - and hopefully better quality - panel decisions.
Pursuing this line of reasoning, David Wirth points out that "[t]he
presence of affected nongovernmental parties would widen
perspectives on the underlying dispute, thereby reducing the
likelihood of erroneous conclusions."" Second, a closed dispute
resolution process will undermine popular support.99  The
general public of a country that loses a WTO dispute will be
more apt to cooperate with the required legislative change if the
WTO dispute resolution process seems fair. As Kevin Stairs and
Peter Taylor note, "[1]egitimacy of governmental decision-making
is enhanced by NGO participation." "
An impetus behind NGOs' desire to participate in WTO
dispute resolution is that GATT panels have not performed well
in adjudicating environmental disputes, particularly in the tuna-
96 See The Proposals of the International Organisation of Consumer Unions,
in INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION OF CONSUMER UNIONS, THE CASE FOR
OPENNESS: CONSULTATION AND TRANSPARENCY IN THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANISATION (1994).
97 ERNST-ULRICHPETERSMANN, INTERNATIONALAND EUROPEAN TRADE
AND ENvIRONMENTAL LAW AFTER THE URUGUAY ROUND 22 (1995)
(emphasis added) (footnote omitted). It should be noted that the WTO is a
forum for the pursuit of public rights, not private rights. While any
adjudication can affect parties not directly engaged in the dispute, adjudication
about public rights is more likely to affect third parties.
"' David A. Wirth, Reexamining Decision-Making Processes in International
Environmental Law, 79 IOWA L. REv. 769, 790 (1994).
99 For example, United States Trade Representative Mickey Kantor referred
to GATT adjudication as "star chamber proceedings," a condemnation unlikely
to build American confidence in the trading system. United States Trade Repre-
sentative Mickey Kantor Remarks on Trade and the Environment at the Global
Legislators Organization for a Balanced Environment, FED. NEWS SERVICE, Feb.
28, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News File.
10 Kevin Stairs & Peter Taylor, Non-Governmental Organizations and the
Legal Protection of the Oceans: A Case Study, in THE INTERNATIONAL POLMCS
OF THE ENVIRONMENT 110, 134 (Andrew Hurrell & Benedict Kingsbury eds.,
1992).
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dolphin controversy. 1' The tuna panel decisions were neither
thorough nor entirely logical. 02  The low quality of these
environmental decisions - as compared to typically high quality
GATT decisions in the more common commercial disputes -
suggests a need to improve the information provided to a WTO
panel.0 3  Although it does not provide a* mandate for NGO
amicus briefs, the Uruguay Round Agreement does take steps to
improve the adjudication process. Most importantly, the Uruguay
Round established an appellate review process that will provide a
mechanism for correcting erroneous panel decisions.' °4
Those critical of direct access by NGOs to WTO panels
usually argue that NGOs should filter comments through their
sovereign governments.0 5 There are, however, several problems
with this argument. First, as noted above, international NGOs do
not fit the traditional citizen-government model. Second, NGOs
from countries who are not members of the WTO are not
represented by governments with WTO participatory rights." 6
Thus, environmental NGOs in large nations like China or Russia
might have valuable information for a WTO panel, but are
prevented from supplying such input. Third, a government may
not want to present a point urged by one of "its" NGOs. There
could be a benign reason for this: the point could be incorrect.
10 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Dispute Settlement Panel
Report on United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 30 I.L.M. 1594 (1991);
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Dispute Settlement Panel Report on
United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 33 I.L.M. 839 (1994). Neither
panel decision was adopted by the GATT Council.
102 For a critique of these decisions, see Steve Charnovitz, Dolphins and
Tuna: An Analysis of the Second GA 77 Panel Report, 24 ENvTL. L. REP. 10567
(1994). See also Howard F. Chang, An Economic Analysis of Trade Measures to
Protect the Global Environment, 83 GEO. L.J. 2131, 2209 (1995) (stating the
panels' "crude but sweeping rules against trade restrictions... make no attempt
to distinguish between legitimate environmental concerns and protectionism").
103 In response to NGO criticism of the first tuna-dolphin panel, the
GATT, in 1992, placed a well respected expert in international environmental
law (Austrian diplomat Winfried Lang) on the panel considering the second
tuna-dolphin case. Lang has noted that "[t]he merger of trade law expertise and
environmental law expertise would certainly facilitate balanced outcomes....
Winfried Lang, Is the Protection of the Environment a Challenge to the Interna-
tional Trading System?, 7 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 463, 480-81 (1995).
'04 See Understanding, supra note 12, arts. 17-19, 33 I.L.M. at 1236-37.
105 See Nichols, supra note 41, at 314.
106 See Knock, Knock, ECONOMIST, Jan. 13, 1996, at 72 (listing twenty-seven
countries, from Albania to Vietnam, that are waiting to join the WTO).
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But, there might also be a less benign reason: a government
might not want to repeat an NGO point if doing so could
undermine the government in another WTO case or in domestic
litigation. For example, while the United States Trade Represen-
tative ("USTR") defended the U.S. tuna import ban against the
European Commission, the USTR pressed the Commission to
repeal a pending ban on the import of furs caught in countries
permitting leg-hold traps. Perhaps the USTR withheld arguments
in the tuna-dolphin case for fear that the Commission would turn
those arguments against the United States in a fur trapping case or
in another subsequent panel."07 Such latent conflicts of interest
would provide a compelling reason to allow NGOs to present
their best points directly.
Additionally, there is the possibility that defendant govern-
ments - particularly the United States with its separation of
powers - might prefer to lose a WTO case if the executive
branch dislikes the law being contested.0 8 Similarly, one group
within a government, such as the trade officials who speak before
WTO panels, might mount a weak defense.' In such scenarios
of conflicting governmental interest, Nichols' assumptions that
governments can be depended on to synthesize and balance values
is not warranted.110
Even some supposedly proparticipation governments are
107 For example, the U.S. Ambassador to the EU (Stuart Eizenstat) has
complained that the EU regulation is "an application of internal rules on an
external basis limiting trade in ways that are unilateral and extraterritorial."
EU Ministers Vote For Trade Ban on Fur From Leghold Traps If No Pact in 1996,
Daily Exec. Rep. (BNA) No. 44, at A12 (Mar. 6, 1996). Yet in the tuna-
dolphin dispute, the USTR defended a similar application of a trade measure
against EU complaints that the Marine Mammal Protection Act was unilateral
and extraterritorial. It is this obvious contradiction in U.S. government policy
that has led some environmentalists to wonder how vigorously USTR attorneys
defended the U.S. Marine Mammal Protection Act before the two panels that
found the Act to be a GATT violation.
108 See Kingsbury, supra note 11, at 15 (asserting that "[t]he executive has
on occasion welcomed - and perhaps even encouraged - adverse GATT
rulings as a means to overcome opposing pressures in domestic politics").
109 See Patti Goldman, The Democratization of the Development of United
States Trade Policy, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 631, 692-93 (1994) (notin that
because the U.S. Trade Representative may bargain away one matter tat is
being challenged in return for an unrelated concession, the U.S. Department of
Justice should-represent the United States before the GATT when U.S. laws are
challenged).
11 See Nichols, supra note 41, at 311.
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sometimes reluctant to listen to NGOs. For example, in March
1994, the Clinton Administration, with great fanfare, created a
trade and environment NGO advisory committee."' Two years
later, however, the Administration had not yet held the first
meeting of this advisory committee.
Nichols seems to recognize the possibility of such conflicts,
but he worries instead about the spectacle of a domestic constitu-
ency opposing the position of the government that is supposed to
represent that constituency.12  Yet surely we are used to that
spectacle by now."3  Domestic opposition to a governmental
position is quite common in domestic public law litigation and is
increasingly common in "transnational public law litigation."
1 1 4
One such spectacle occurred in 1981 when the United States
Senate restaurant workers lodged an ILO complaint stating that
the Senate management refused to negotiate with them.' The
ILO performed a fair investigation without "irreconcilable
dissonance.""' 6
Thus far, I have focused on possible inadequacies in the
representations made by governments to WTO panels, yet there
is even a more fundamental reason to move to a Stakeholders
model: defects within the WTO itself. Fundamentally, the WTO
Agreement fails to recognize the global environment. It is a
treaty about trade across economic borders. If there were no
ocean, no atmosphere, no Antarctica, no cross-border pollution,
and no biodiversity, not a single word in the WTO would need
to be rewritten. The WTO is replete with constructive rules on
the topic of economic interdependence, but it is vacuous on the
topic of ecological interdependence.
The absence of attention to ecological interdependence necessi-
"' See Exec. Order No. 12,905, 59 Fed. Reg. 14,733 (1994).
112 See Nichols, supra note 41, at 317.
113 In a related context, the U.S. government has recognized that NGOs
might pursue objectives in international standard organizations that are
inconsistent with official U.S. policy. See 19 U.S.C. § 2543(b)(3) (1994).
114 Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J.
2347, 2368 (1991) (discussing suits in which plaintiffs seek affirmative reform of
U.S. foreign policy programs).
15 See Elmer W. Lammi, Senate Restaurant Workers Complain to ILO, UPI,
Nov. 30, 1981, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
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tates fundamental reform of the WTO.17  In the meantime, to
fill this gap it would be useful to permit NGOs to make written
presentations to WTO panels.' Each panel might also hold
one day of public hearings where NGOs could testify. An
appropriate time for such NGO input would be after the panel
completes a draft on the factual background of the dispute and
summarizes the positions of the parties."1 The WTO should
release these interim factual and positional drafts to the public
before the hearing so that those testifying can comment on them.
Nichols worries that any such hearings would present logistical
problems since "a trade dispute panel cannot possibly hear from
thousands of groups." 20 As with any legislative hearing, howev-
er, the chairperson can determine who will be allowed to speak.
Alternatively, NGOs could act collectively to select their
spokespersons.1
2 1
If direct participation by NGOs produces too much incoher-
ence, the WTO might try a more organized approach. For
117 For some proposals regarding fundamental reform of the WTO, see
Steve Charnovitz, Improving Environmental and Trade Governance, 7 INT'L
ENvTL. AFF. 59, 76-81 (1995) (proposing the creation of a new Global
Environmental Organization and the expansion of the WTO as potential
reforms).
m See TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT PRINCIPLES 31 (1994)
(containing a working group report established by the International Institute
for Sustainable Development which advocated that NGOs be allowed to make
written presentations to WTO panels). See also Michael Kantor, Remarks to
the Environmental Defense Fund 4 (Apr. 21, 1994) (on file with author)
("There should be a right to file and have 'amicus' briefs considered by a Panel
... and, greater obligation of Panels to rely on technical experts where issues
beyond trade rules are relevant."); JAMES CAMERON ET AL., WORLD WIDE
FUND FOR NATURE, SUsTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATED DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT IN GATT 1994 12-14 (1994) (discussing reforms to the WTO
dispute settlement procedures which would allow NGO access to information
as well as access to the GATT decisionmaking processes).
"9 See Understanding, supra note 12, arts. 17-19, 33 I.L.M. at 1245-46
(describing the panel working procedure which provides a timeline for panels
and an interim review period).
120 Nichols, supra note 41, at 319.
1 The World Conservation Union can help in selecting spokespersons and
NGOs could follow the model of other organizations. See Martin W.
Holdgate, Pathways to Sustainability: The Evolving Role of Transnational
Institutions, ENVIRONMENT, Nov. 1995, at 16, 39 (discussing how "NGOs
working in fields like development, science, or humanitarian aid should
consider creating a group that can speak for all of them, as ICSU speaks for
science and IUCN was designed to speak for conservation").
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example, the WTO could ask an intergovernmental environmental
organization, such as the United Nations Environment
Programme or the World Conservation Union, to name an
"Environmental Advocate" to speak for "the environment" in
WTO environmental disputes.12 The Environmental Advocate
would work with NGOs and scientists to produce a report
discussing the significance of the environmental treaty or law
challenged in the WTO dispute resolution procedure.
Another model that could assure a just representation of
environmental interests before WTO panels existed within the
Permanent Court of International Justice. This court provided for
a special chamber - for labor issues only - in which the judges
appoint "technical assessors" who would be "chosen with a view
to ensuring a just representation of the competing interests."1"
4. CONCLUSION
The establishment of the WTO should improve international
trade governance. The WTO has the authority to consider new
trade rules, to review national trade laws, and to adjudicate
disputes. The Charter of the ITO, written in 194648, recognized
the need for involving NGOs. Although that organization never
came into existence, the birth of its nephew, the WTO, provides
an opportunity to correct the GATT practice of excluding
NGOs.
NGOs play constructive roles in numerous international
organizations. It seems clear that these roles will increase in the
years ahead. If it is appropriate for NGOs to provide input to
national governments about trade issues, then it is also appropriate
for NGOs to provide input to international organizations about
122 The European Court of Justice uses advocates-general who make
reasoned submissions on cases before it. See generally K.P.E. LASOK, THE
EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 9, 219 (1984)
(setting forth the duties of the advocates-general).
123 MANLEY 0. HUDSON, THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL
JUSTICE 150 (1934) (quoting the language of Article 26 of the Statute of the
Permanent Court of International Justice). This "technical assessor" provision
was never used. See id. at 328, 349.
124 See generally Martin Lukas, The Role of Private Parties in the Enforcement
of the Uruguay Round Agreements, 29 J. WORLD TRADE, Oct. 1995, at 181-206
(arguing that a private right to initiate the dispute resolution system of the
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trade issues.
Simply put, there are no good reasons for the WTO to refuse
to provide systematic participation rights for NGOs. One hopes
that WTO members will see this reality while the WTO still
enjoys the goodwill afforded to new international institutions. As
U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull told the Dumbarton Oaks
Conference in 1944, "[n]o institution will endure unless there is
behind it considered and complete public support." 12s
125 ERSKINE CHILDERS & BRIAN URQUHART, RENEWING THE UNITED
NATIONS SYSTEM 171 (1994).
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